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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
GLENN EARL LLOYD, II, i Case No. 960214-CA 
Defendant/Appellee• : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the preliminary hearing court's 
dismissal of one count of pattern of unlawful activity, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-10-1603 and 76-10-1603.5 (1995); and ten counts of 
money laundering, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1995). This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 
1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the preliminary hearing court err in concluding 
that there was insufficient evidence of an "enterprise"to bind 
defendant over on a charge of pattern of unlawful conduct? 
2. Did the preliminary hearing court err in concluding 
that there was insufficient evidence of defendant's intent to 
conceal the proceeds to bind defendant over on ten charges of 
money laundering? 
• * * 
In reviewing a dismissal for insufficient evidence, the 
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party and, when so viewed, determine if 
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support a prima 
facie case. If so, the dismissal must be reversed. Highland 
Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 
1984); Management Committee. etc. v. Graystone Pines. 652 P.2d 
896, 898 (Utah 1982). See State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1230 
(Utah 1995) (upholding bind over "because we cannot say that "the 
evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference 
to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] 
claim[.]"). See also State v. Jaeger. 896 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 
1995) ("the ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over 
for trial presents a question of law" which is reviewed "de novo 
without deference"). 
These issues are preserved in the record (see R. 363-
390, 423-433, 1251-1263, 1276-1284). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are contained in addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a multiple count information 
with 14 felony counts of securities fraud in violation of Utah 
2 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (1995 and Supp. 1996); 10 felony 
counts of offering unregistered securities in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7 and 61-1-21 (1995 and Supp. 1996); 1 second 
degree felony count of pattern of unlawful activity in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1603 and 76-10-1603.5 (1995); and 10 
second degree felony counts of money laundering, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1995) (R. 307-332). Following a 
preliminary hearing held on November 13-16, 1995, defendant was 
bound over for trial on all (counts 1-24) but the pattern of 
unlawful activity (count 25) and money laundering charges (counts 
26-35) (R. 457-466) (a copy of the trial court's written Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order is contained in Addendum 
A). The State appeals the order dismissing these charges. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
In the mid to late 1980's and continuing up until the 
filing of the instant charges, on November 13, 1995, defendant 
networked social and professional acquaintances to gain 
introductions to several Utah doctors (see, e.g.. R. 307, 836-38, 
856-57, 902, 923-24, 1008, 1061, 1195). Defendant represented 
1
 The State's recitation of events underlying the charges 
is derived from evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and 
is set forth in the light most favorable to the State, including 
all reasonable inferences therefrom. See State v. Pledger. 896 
P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995) (directing magistrates to view preliminary 
hearing evidence in light most favorable to prosecution and 
resolve all inferences in the prosecution's favor). 
3 
himself as a financial advisor and offered to assist the doctors 
with financial advice regarding both their individual and/or 
office pension plans as well as their personal investment goals 
(see, e.g.. R. 836-38, 857, 898, 902-03, 924, 953, 977, 1009, 
1061, 1095). Defendant initially purported to represent the 
investment firms Coordinated Financial Services and/or Richards 
Investments (R. 923, 953, 978, 1009, 1062), stating that he was 
part of an investment organization with offices in New York City, 
New York, and Salt Lake City, Utah (Id.). In describing his 
investment group, defendant suggested to at least one doctor that 
"there were several people7' in the group, "on [the] due diligence 
committee that looked at different projects to see if they were 
viable to invest in[.]" (R. 978). By the early 1990s, defendant 
had established his own investment advisor business, Applied 
Financial Concepts (see, e.g.. R. 897, 1025, 1062). He 
continued, however, to offer securities through Richards 
Investments (Supp. R. 1621, Exh. #71). 
Typically, defendant met with the doctors one on one 
(see, e.g.. R. 816-17, 821, 1063), to discuss their individual 
pension plans and to suggest various ulow risk investment 
opportunities" in approximately ten different companies (see. 
e.g.. R. 820, 823, 833, 863, 872, 882, 954). Defendant promised 
the doctors that they would receive interest payments on their 
investments ranging anywhere from 8% to 15% (see, e.g.. R. 905-
4 
06, 982, 1049), and that at the end of a specified period, the 
doctors' principal investment would be returned in full (see, 
e.g., R. 824, 846, 861, 906, 999, 1003-04, 1052, 1065, 1081, 
1197-98). Defendant assured the doctors that their investments 
were "secured" by liens on the capital owned by the individual 
companies (see, e.g.. R. 820, 863, 872, 913, 1024, 1065, 1076, 
1196). 
In addition to these assurances, defendant encouraged 
hesitant doctors to invest by stressing that his own investment 
advisor business, Applied Financial Concepts, was also investing 
in a particular company (see, e.g., R. 891, 897, 1015, 1025, 
1052). As a consequence, the doctors believed that defendant was 
acting solely as an agent seeking investors and that he had no 
personal interest in the various offered businesses (see, e.g., 
R. 93 9, 961, 991). The doctors were further led to believe that 
defendant would receive his compensation in fees and percentages 
from the companies he purported to represent (see, e.g., R. 862, 
872, 983, 1201). 
Based on defendant's representations and assurances, 
each of the nine doctors agreed to invest in at least one of the 
companies defendant offered (see, e.g.. R. 815-817, 830-31, 858, 
868, 874, 877, 904, 928, 978, 989, 1017-18, 1064, 1068, 1075, 
1077, 1145, Supp. R. 1433-1523, 1525-1540, Exh. ## 53A-59A, 61A-
63A). Each doctor choosing to invest in a particular company 
5 
personally handed defendant a check made out to that business in 
amounts varying from between $10,000 and $150,000 (Id.). 
Significantly, defendant never informed any doctor that 
he had been enjoined by the United States Department of Labor 
from "acting in any fiduciary capacity and from providing 
investment advice" for a ten year period beginning May 29, 1990 
(see, e.g., R. 826, 848, 908, 939, 985, 1000-02, 1028, 1086, 
1204). Nor did he inform any doctor that his Idaho securities 
license had been revoked (see, e.g.. R. 882, 1030, 1086). 
Although several doctors received minimal returns on 
their investment, the returns were in the form of cashiers' 
checks drawn on a bank, rather than from any particular company 
in which the doctor had invested (R. 907, 941, 983, 992, 1054-
55). These payments did not continue, nor did any doctor recover 
his full investment at the end of the specified period (Id.). 
State's investigator Verdi White looked into 
allegations of defendant's involvement in securities fraud and 
money laundering (R. 1119). In so doing, White uncovered nine 
checking accounts at several Utah banks wherein defendant 
deposited the doctors' monies. Although defendant owned and 
controlled these accounts, they were named after the registered 
and unregistered businesses for which defendant had purported to 
solicit the doctors' investments including Sourceline Capital, 
A.F.C., A.F.C. Inter-cap, Internal Capitalization Partnership, 
6 
C.C. Management, F.C. Finance, F.C. Leasing, Peak Strategy 
Management, and Tempus Utile (R. 1109-1186, 1223-1235).2 White 
did not determine whether any of these checking accounts were 
interest bearing accounts and did not view that information as 
critical to his investigation (R. 1155-56). Rather, White 
tracked the doctors' monies into and out of the various 
defendant controlled accounts, including defendant's personal 
withdrawals and transfers between accounts.3 White also 
investigated whether there was any ongoing business and/or 
company associated with any of the account names and found none 
(R. 1156, 1162). Although one of the account names was also a 
limited corporation, White found no indication of an ongoing 
business related to that account. White concluded that the 
accounts were merely shell accounts (R. 1183-85). 
2
 Defendant also deposited one doctor's money into an 
account, Cross Country Management, over which he did not have 
signatory authority (R. 1157) . 
3
 To assist the preliminary hearing court in keeping 
track of the multiple transactions investigated, White had a 
chart and spreadsheet prepared for each account depicting the 
amounts of and dates on which the victims' checks were deposited, 
as well as the amounts of and dates on which defendant made 
subsequent withdrawals from and/or transfers between the suspect 
accounts (R. 1121-22; Supp. R. 1433-1540, Exh. ## 53-59A, 61-
63A). The charts were not intended to reflect a complete 
representation of the activity in each individual account, but 
rather to focus on those transactions involving the doctors' 
monies (R. 1138). The State's recitation of the evidence 
supporting the information highlights those transactions 
emphasized in the preliminary hearing and does not attempt to 
detail every transaction otherwise set forth in the spreadsheets. 
7 
Defendant never informed the doctors that their money 
would be deposited into these accounts and/or transferred to and 
commingled with funds in other defendant controlled accounts (see 
e.g.. R. 873, 875, 881, 883-84, 888-89, 909, 919, 940-41, 1029, 
1077, 1079-80, 1100-03, 1204-06, 1211). 
The transactions in each account pertinent to the 
charges of pattern of unlawful conduct and money laundering are 
set forth below. 
Sourceline Capital. Defendant maintained sole 
signatory authority for this First Security Bank Account (FSB) 
(R. 1124-25). Although defendant registered the Sourceline 
Capital name for business purposes, listing himself and Jerry 
Sheets as the owners (R. 1124-25; Supp. R. 1327-1329, Exh. #5), 
White found no evidence of an ongoing business operating under 
that name (R. 1124-25, 1133) .4 
Deposits. In May 1993, defendant opened this account 
by depositing a $10,000 check solicited from Dr. Sheffield (Supp. 
R. 1367-1368, 1524-1526, Exh. ## 23, 61-61A). Later this same 
month, defendant, transferred $1,500 from his financial advisor 
Defendant maintained another Sourceline account at 
Draper Bank from which funds were transferred to the F.C. Finance 
account discussed at p. 10, infra (see Supp. R. 1448, Exh. # 56). 
Because no victims' proceeds were directly deposited into this 
second Sourceline account, no chart and spreadsheet for the 
account were introduced at the preliminary hearing. 
8 
business account, Applied Financial Concepts (Supp. R. 1524-1526, 
Exh. ## 61-61A).5 
Withdrawals/Transfers. Following these deposits and 
prior to March 1994, defendant personally withdrew $8,873 from 
the account and caused a $1,300 check to be issued to his wife, 
Julie Lloyd (R. 1126-27; Supp. R. 1524-1526, Exh. ##61-61A). 
Defendant also transferred $1,525 to the Applied Financial 
Concepts account (Id.) 
F.C. Finance. This FSB account was solely owned and 
controlled by defendant (R. 1137). Defendant registered the F.C. 
Finance name for business purposes, but White found no other 
evidence of an ongoing business (R. 1138, 1143) . 
Deposits. Defendant opened the account in March 1990 
when he deposited the first of many checks solicited from Dr. 
Nelson; the chart and spreadsheet prepared for the F.C. Finance 
account reflect that from approximately March 1990 to July 1992, 
defendant deposited $40,394 of Dr. Nelson's money into the 
account (Supp. R. 1448-1473, Exh. ## 56-56A). Additionally, 
during March 1990 to March 1994, defendant transferred funds from 
his other accounts including F.C. Leasing ($24,777), Peak 
5
 Although the charts and spreadsheets admitted below 
reflect a number of transfers to and from the Applied Financial 
Concepts account to defendant's other accounts, no victims' check 
were directly deposited into the Applied Financial Concepts 
account, thus, the specific chart and spreadsheet for this 
account were not introduced into evidence. 
9 
Strategy ($45,563), Sourceline Capital (FSB) ($1,838), C.C. 
Management ($25,000) (Id.). and a second F.C. Finance account 
which defendant maintained at West One Bank (WOB) ($3,750) (Id.) .6 
Withdrawals/Transfers. Following the deposit of Dr. 
Nelson's first check on March 13, 1990, and up until March 1994, 
defendant personally withdrew approximately $2 9,245 from the F.C. 
Finance account (Id.). Further, defendant transferred proceeds 
from this account to his other controlled accounts including 
Tempus Utile ($2,000), and F.C. Leasing ($4,331), Internal 
Capitalization Partnership ($1,000), and the WOB F.C. Finance 
account ($9,165). Checks were also drawn on the account and 
issued to defendant's business account, Applied Financial 
Concepts ($1,000), and to his wife ($ 7,050) (Id.). 
F.C. Leasing. Defendant maintained sole signatory 
authority over this FSB account (R. 1144). While defendant 
registered the F.C. Leasing name for business purposes, White 
found no indication that F.C. Leasing was an ongoing company (R. 
1144) . 
Deposits. The chart and spreadsheet for this account 
reveal that from approximately December 1991 to May 1993, 
Defendant transferred an additional $19,000 from a 
second Sourceline account maintained at the Draper Bank (Supp. R. 
1448, Exh. # 56). See supra note 4. The chart and spreadsheet 
for this second Sourceline account, as well as the second F.C. 
Leasing account maintained at WOB were not introduced below. 
10 
defendant deposited proceeds from doctors Ellingson ($20,000), 
Rappleye ($29,250), Gruwell ($40,975), Bennett ($20,000), Nelson 
($79,230), Gadd ($15,000), Robinson ($10,000) and Saunders 
($25,000) (Supp. R. 1474-1509, Exh. ## 57-57A) . Additionally, 
from approximately January 1990 to May 1993, defendant 
transferred funds into this account from his financial advisor 
business account, Applied Financial Concepts, ($28.28), and his 
other accounts' including International Capitalization ($1,000), 
F.C. Finance ($7,356), and Tempus Utile ($6,216) (Id.). 
Withdrawals/Transfers. From approximately January 1990 
to June 1994, defendant personally withdrew approximately $57,337 
from the account, and caused additional checks to be issued to 
his wife ($6,100), and to his investment business account, 
Applied Financial Concepts ($13,000) (Id.). Defendant also 
transferred funds to his other solely controlled accounts 
including Tempus Utile ($2,500), F.C. Finance ($33,102), and 
Sourceline Capital ($33,325) (Id.). 
Tempus Utile. Defendant was the sole signatory on this 
First Interstate Bank account (R. 1165). The Tempus Utile name 
was also registered as a limited liability company listing 
defendant, Wayne King, Colleen King and Pat Murphy as its 
managers (Id.). 
Deposits. Defendant deposited a $15,000 check 
solicited from Dr. Bennett on February 6, 1992. Prior to the 
11 
Nelson deposit, the account had a balance of $129.26 (Supp. R. 
1527, 1532, Exh. ## 62-62A). The chart and spreadsheet for this 
account further indicate that up until approximately September 
1992, defendant deposited additional checks solicited from 
doctors Nelson ($10,000), Saunders ($25,000), Gruwell ($10,000), 
Gadd ($10,000) and Rappleye ($10,000) (Id.). Defendant also 
transferred funds to this account from other accounts including 
F.C. Finance ($2,000), F.C. Leasing ($2,500) and his investment 
business account ($10,000) (Id.). 
Withdrawals/Transfers. Defendant made personal 
withdrawals from the account ($8,048) and also transferred money 
to his other accounts' including F.C. Finance ($2,000), F.C. 
Leasing ($2,500), and Sourceline Capital ($10,000) (Id.). 
A.F.C. Defendant had sole signatory authority this FSB 
account (R. 1147). A.F.C. was not a registered business name 
(Supp. R. 1335-1339, Exh. #8), nor did White find any other 
evidence of an ongoing company under this acronym (R. 114 9). The 
account was separate from defendant's business account, Applied 
Financial Concepts, which name was registered for business 
purposes (R. 114 9). 
Deposits. Defendant opened this account with a $100 
deposit on December 3, 1990. Thereafter, between December 3, 
1990 and December 6, 1990, defendant deposited checks solicited 
from Dr. Rappleye ($10,000) (Supp. R. 1541-1598, Exh. # 68 
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(Rappleye Deposition, see Supp. R. 1599, Exh. # 1, attached 
thereto)), Dr. Gruwell ($10,000) (Supp. R. 1373-1374, Exh. #26), 
and Dr. Nelson ($10,000) (Supp. R. 1393-1394, Exh. #36) (see R. 
1148; Supp. R. 1432-1433, Exh. ## 53-53A). He also deposited a 
$10,000, from an unknown source (Supp. R. 1433, Exh. # 53A). 
Withdrawals/Transfers. By December 7, 1990, defendant 
had personally withdrawn all but the initial $100 deposit from 
this account (Id.). 
Peak Strategy Management. Defendant maintained sole 
signatory authority for this FSB account (R. 1153). Peak 
Strategy Management was not a registered business name, nor did 
White find any other evidence of an ongoing business (R. 1153). 
Deposits. Defendant opened the account in October 1993 
by depositing a $25,000 check solicited from Dr. Nelson (Supp. R. 
1521, Exh. ## 59A). Thereafter, from approximately October 1993 
to March 1994, defendant deposited additional monies solicited 
from Dr. Nelson ($45,000), as well as Dr. Bennett ($20,625) 
(Supp. R. 1409-1412, 1520-1523, Exh. ## 42, 59-59A). 
Withdrawals/Transfers. During this same period 
defendant made personal withdrawals ($5,000) and transferred 
funds to his other accounts including F.C. Finance ($45,563), and 
Applied Financial Concepts ($5,125) (Id.). 
Cross Country Management. This Bank One account was 
the only account not solely owned and controlled by defendant; 
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rather, the account signatories were listed as Ed Parker and 
Myron Abbott (R. 1157) . However, defendant opened the account on 
July 20, 1993, depositing a $25,000 check from Dr. Nelson (Supp. 
R. 1533-1540, Exh. ## 63-63A). Seven days later, on July 27, 
1993, Abbott issued a check for $25,000 to F.C. Finance, an 
account over which defendant did maintain sole control (Id.). 
There were no other deposits to the account between July 20, 1990 
and July 27, 1990 (Id.). 
Similarly, defendant deposited a $10,000 check from Dr. 
Bennett on August 12, 1993 (Supp. R. 1533-1540, Exh. ## 63-63A). 
Prior to this deposit, the account balance was $51.63 (Id.). One 
day later, on August 13, 1993, an entity known as G&H Market 
deposited $1,350 into the Cross Country Management account (Id.). 
Three days later after G&H Market deposit, on August 16, 1993, 
$10,000 was transferred from the Cross Country Management account 
to the defendant-controlled FC Finance account, leaving a balance 
of $1,401.63 in the Cross Country Management account (Id.). 
A.F.C. Inter-cap. Defendant maintained sole signatory 
authority for this Zions National Bank (ZNB) account (R. 1159). 
The A.F.C. Inter-cap name was not registered for business 
purposes, nor did White find any other indication of an ongoing 
company (R. 1161). 
Deposits. The chart and spreadsheet for this account 
indicate that defendant opened it on December 26, 1991 with a 
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$20,000 check received from Dr. Bennett (Supp. R. 1434-1440, Exh. 
##. 54-54A). On July 1, 1992, defendant deposited a $15,000 
check received from Dr. Saunders (Id.). From the opening date of 
the account up until January 1993, defendant also transferred 
additional funds to the account from the Internal Capitalization 
Partnership ($6,799) and Sourceline Capital ($925) accounts 
(ULJ • 
Withdrawals/Transfers. Additionally, over this same 
period, defendant personally withdrew $1,500 from the account, 
and transferred funds to his other accounts including F.C. 
Leasing ($2,062) and Sourceline Capital ($21,137) (JJJL.) . 
C.C. Management. Defendant maintained sole signatory 
authority for this FSB account (R. 1168). C.C. Management was 
not registered as a business name and White found no indication 
that it is an otherwise ongoing company (Id.). 
Deposits. Defendant opened the account on October 25, 
1993, depositing a $25,000 check solicited from Dr. Nelson (R. 
1168-69; Supp. R. 1441-1447, Exh. ## 55-55A) . Over the next 
eight month period until May 1994, defendant deposited an 
additional $65,000 of Dr. Nelson's money into the account (Id.), 
Withdrawals/Transfers. During this same period, 
defendant withdrew funds from the C.C. Management account on his 
own behalf ($31,000), and on behalf of his wife ($2,000) (Exh. ## 
55-55A). He also transferred funds to his business account, 
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Applied Financial Concepts ($8,000), and to his other controlled 
accounts including F.C. Finance ($45,000) and Peak Strategy 
($20,000) (IJLJ • 
Internal Capitalization Partnership. Defendant was the 
sole signatory for this FSB account (R. 1170). The name was not 
registered for business purposes, nor did White find any other 
indication of an ongoing company known as Internal Capitalization 
Partnership (Id.). 
Deposits. The chart and spreadsheet for this account 
indicate that a $15,000 check solicited from Dr. Gruwell was the 
opening deposit for this account (Supp. R. 1510-1519, Exh. ## 58-
58A). From approximately December 1989 to November 1991, 
defendant deposited an additional $15,000 of Dr. Gruwell's money, 
as well as checks solicited from doctors Nelson ($75,000), 
Bennett ($15,000), Gadd ($15,000), and Rappleye ($30,000) (Id.). 
He also transferred funds to the account from his F.C. Finance 
account ($1,000) (Id.). 
Withdrawals/Transfers. From approximately January 
1990 to December 1991, defendant transferred funds from this 
account to his investment business account ($4,800), and to his 
other accounts including A.F.C. Inter-cap ($6,799), and F.C. 
Leasing ($1,000) (Id.). 
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Ruling. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, 
the magistrate made the following uncontroverted factual findings: 
a. During all times relevant to the charges presented 
(1991 through 1994), defendant maintained an 
investment advisor business entitled Applied 
Financial Concepts through which he gave 
investment advice, assisted individuals in 
investing their money and transferred individuals' 
money to various investments, 
b. The defendant represented himself as an 
investment advisor to [doctors Bennett, 
Sheffield, Ellingson, Gruwell, Saunders, 
Nelson, Robinson, Gadd and Rappleye]. 
c. In his capacity as an investment advisor, 
defendant personally met with each of the 
above-referenced individuals to discuss 
investing in one or more of the following 
companies: FC Leasing, CC Management, Cross 
Country Management, Peak Strategy Management, 
Sourceline Capital, AFC Inter-Cap, Internal 
Capitalization Partnership, Tempus Utile, FC 
Finance, and AFC. 
d. In each meeting, defendant described [these] 
companies as existing, viable companies doing 
business in the State of Utah. 
e. The defendant told each physician that his 
investments were low risk and that his 
principal would be returned in a period of 
one to three years and during that time 
period, the physicians would receive monthly 
or quarterly interest payments, ranging from 
eight to fourteen percent. 
f. After the physicians were offered the 
securities, the physicians agreed to invest 
in the described business and, in each 
instance physically handed the defendant a 
check issued to the specific business in 
which they had decided to invest. 
g. The defendant opened the following checking 
accounts through the use of registered and 
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unregistered dbas: Sourceline Capital 
(Draper Bank) ("Draper") #91-02679-9, FC 
Finance (First Security Bank ("FSB") #216-
26776-10)), FC Leasing (FSB #216-25076-16), 
AFC (FSB #216-26091-15), Peak Strategy 
Management (FSB #216-1019290), (Cross Country 
Management (Bank One #1162-8004), AFC Inter-
Cap (Zions Bank #015-352206), Tempus Utile 
(First Interstate Bank #26-03050-2), CC 
Management (FSB #216-10192-82), and Internal 
Capitalization Management (FSB #216-00229-
15). The defendant was the sole signatory on 
these accounts and defendant was the only 
person who deposited or withdrew money out of 
these accounts. 
There were two Sourceline Capital accounts, 
one at Draper Bank and one at First Security 
Bank. The Sourceline Capital account at 
Draper Bank listed Jerry Sheets as a 
signatory and is not relevant to the State's 
money laundering charge. However, the First 
Security Bank Sourceline Capital account (FSB 
#216-00015-88) was established by the 
defendant and he was the sole signatory. 
After the defendant personally received the 
victims' checks, he deposited the checks into 
[these]accounts which he owned and 
controlled. These accounts bore the name of 
the security offered the victim so the money 
could be deposited into that account.7 
Cross Country Management at Bank One listed 
Myron Lee Abbott and Edward C. Parker as 
signatories. However, Dr. Nelson's $25,000 
was the opening deposit in that account on 
July 20, 1993. On that same day, $10,000 
cash was also placed in the account. On July 
27, 1993, Myron Abbott issued a check for 
$15,000 from the Cross Country account to FC 
Finance, an account over which the defendant 
7
 The trial court also made findings as to which victims 
money went to which defendant controlled account, which are not 
duplicated here(see R. 461-62, a complete copy of the 
magistrate's ruling is contained in addendum A ) . 
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had sole control. Other than these three 
transactions, no other money went in or out 
of the Cross Country Management account 
during the week of July 20-27, 1993. Within 
one week, the defendant gained control over 
Dr. Nelson's $25,000, which Dr. Nelson was 
told would be invested in a business entitled 
Cross Country Management. 
At all times relevant hereto, the defendant 
told the victims that their proceeds were 
invested in the existing, viable Utah 
companies which he initially offered them and 
that the proceeds were not in his control. 
Defendant refused to answer the physicians' 
questions regarding the proceeds' location, 
nature and control. 
Each time a victim actually received an 
alleged interest payment on his investment, 
he would receive it in the form of a 
cashier's check drawn on a bank and not from 
the alleged investment entity or even the 
defendant-controlled account by the same 
name. 
After the physicians' funds were deposited 
into one or more of the defendant-controlled 
accounts, the spreadsheets (Exh. ##53A-59A, 
61A-63A) established that the following 
relevant activity occurred: 1) Funds would 
be withdrawn and deposited in the various 
defendant-controlled accounts; 2) Funds would 
be withdrawn from the defendant-controlled 
accounts and deposited into one or more of 
the defendant's personal accounts; 3) Funds 
would be withdrawn from the defendant-
controlled accounts and transferred to other 
entities not controlled by the defendant; or 
4) Funds would be deposited into the 
defendant-controlled accounts from other 
entities not controlled by the defendant. 
The spreadsheets from each defendant-
controlled account (Exh. ## 53A-59A, 61A-63A) 
established and explained the deposit and 
withdrawal activity which occurred 
specifically between the ten defendant-
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controlled accounts as well as the 
defendant's personal checking accounts. 
However, the State presented no testimony 
explaining the withdrawal and deposit 
activity in the defendant-controlled accounts 
relating to entities not controlled or 
established by the defendant such as Star 
King, Adalyn Financial, Capstone and Towers, 
among others. 
Furthermore, the State's witness which 
testified as to the above-described accounts 
could not tell the Court whether these 
defendant-controlled accounts were interest 
bearing. 
During the time defendant was transferring 
these funds between his accounts and to 
himself, he continued to maintain his 
investment advisor company, Applied Financial 
Concepts, and continued to represent himself 
as an investment advisor. 
(R. 459-464, see addendum A). 
Based on these findings, the magistrate concluded that 
there was probable cause to bind defendant over on twenty four 
counts of securities act violations and that the securities act 
violations also established the pattern element of the pattern of 
unlawful activity charge (R. 464, see addendum A). Although the 
magistrate found sufficient evidence to establish the pattern 
element, the magistrate concluded that there was no probable 
cause to suggest "that defendant's use of his investment advisor 
business, Applied Financial Concepts and his use of various licit 
and illicit dbas in establishing the checking accounts wherein he 
deposited the physicians' checks demonstrated the existence of an 
P-
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enterprise" (R. 465, see addendum A). Rather, the magistrate 
concluded "that the evidence used to establish the existence of 
the investment advisor company as well as the various dbas [was] 
evidence which only further established and prove[d] the elements 
of the pattern (the securities fraud and the sale of unregistered 
securities), and not the existence of an enterprise" (Id.). 
Finally, referring to the ten money laundering counts, the 
magistrate concluded "that there [was] no probable cause to 
establish that the defendant intentionally concealed the proceeds 
since no evidence was presented to answer [its] questions as to 
the various transactions which transpired between the defendant-
controlled accounts and other entities after the deposits of the 
physicians' proceeds into the defendant-controlled accounts" 
(JJL.) • 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. This is an appeal from the magistrate's 
refusal to bind over one charge of pattern of unlawful activity 
and ten charges of money laundering. Concerning the pattern of 
unlawful activity charge, the magistrate correctly concluded that 
defendant's 24 securities act violations (for which he was bound 
over) constituted the pattern element of this offense. However, 
the magistrate erred as a matter of law when it failed to 
conclude that defendant's investment advisor business, Applied 
Financial Concepts, and/or defendant's relationship with various 
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registered and unregistered businesses was sufficient to 
establish the enterprise element of the offense. The 
magistrate's error was driven by its failure to properly apply 
the liberal bind over standard and to fully consider the broad 
remedial purposes of Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. 
POINT II. Additionally, the magistrate misapplied the 
bind over standard and erred as a matter of law when it required 
proof concerning the ultimate use of the laundered proceeds in 
this case. Utah's money laundering statute contains no such 
requirement. Rather, the money laundering statute focuses on 
transactions designed to conceal the proceeds of illegal 
activity. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1994). Contrary to 
the magistrate's reasoning, disguised and/or concealed bank 
deposits like that perpetrated here constitute sufficient proof 
of concealment for money laundering purposes. Moreover, the 
State introduced evidence that defendant transferred the proceeds 
between his controlled accounts and personally withdrew proceeds 
as well. Such is adequate to establish defendant's ultimate 
control over and use of the proceeds for purposes of bind over. 
ARSUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
THAT DEFENDANT'S INVESTMENT ADVISOR BUSINESS 
AND/OR HIS ASSOCIATION-IN-FACT WITH THE 
REGISTERED AND UNREGISTERED BUSINESSES HE 
PURPORTED TO REPRESENT CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT 
22 
INDICIA OF AN ENTERPRISE FOR BIND OVER ON A 
CHARGE OF PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY 
Defendant is charged with violating Utah's Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act (UPUA), Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 (1995) 
(R. 322-23) .8 To convict, the prosecution must establish two 
elements, a pattern of racketeering and the existence of an 
enterprise. £££ State v. McGrath. 749 P.2d 631, 636 (Utah 1988) 
(requiring proof one element beyond the pattern of racketeering 
activity--the existence of an enterprise). Significantly, the 
State need not necessarily adduce different proof to establish 
these separate elements. See United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 
940, 943 doth cir.) (citing United States? v, TurKette, 452 u.s. 
576, 583 (1981) (holding that "proof used to establish these 
separate elements may in particular cases coalesce")), cert. 
denied. 502 U.S. 845 (1991). 
Here, the magistrate correctly concluded that there was 
probable cause to establish the pattern element of the UPUA 
charge, based on its determination that defendant had committed 
24 separate securities act violations (which violations 
Defendant is charged under all three UPUA subsections 
(R. 322-23). UPUA subsections (1) and (2) prohibit the receipt 
and use of proceeds derived from a pattern of unlawful activity 
in the acquisition, establishment, or operation of any 
enterprise, section 76-10-1603(1), and/or the maintenance of any 
interest in or control of any enterprise, section 76-10-1603(2). 
The third subsection, section 76-10-1603(3), prohibits a 
defendant associated with or employed by an enterprise from 
conducting that enterprises affairs through a pattern of unlawful 
activity. 
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constitute the 24 counts previously bound over for trial in this 
matter). The issue in this appeal is the magistrate's erroneous 
further conclusion that the State failed to establish probable 
cause for the second UPUA element, the existence of an enterprise 
(see R. 464, see addendum A). Based on this erroneous 
conclusion, the magistrate dismissed the UPUA charge. The 
dismissal is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes 
underlying the UPUA statute, as well as the liberal bind over 
standard. 
A. UPUA Should be Broadly Interpreted in 
Order to Effectuate its Remedial Purpose 
UPUA was originally enacted in 1981, and was modeled 
after the federal Racketeering Influences and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968.9 This Court has 
previously recognized that while RICO and consequently, UPUA 
"were intended to apply to persons engaged in acts traditionally 
associated with organized crime, a nexus to organized crime was 
not included as an element of the offense." State v. Thompson. 
751 P.2d 805, 815 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Sedima. S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrez Co.. Inc.. 473 U.S. 479, (1985)), rev'd on other grounds. 
810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, UPUA is not limited in 
9
 In 1987, the Legislature changed the title of § 76-10-
1603 from "Utah Racketeering Influence and Criminal Enterprise 
Act" (RICE) to "Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity" (UPUA). 
Because the Act itself remained substantially unchanged, all 
references to RICE in case authority have been changed to UPUA. 
24 
application to persons affiliated with organized crime. Id. See 
also Bradford v. Moench. 670 F.Supp. 920, 928 (D.Utah 1987) 
(noting the similarity between UPUA and RICO). Indeed, the 
underlying purpose of racketeering statutes like RICO and UPUA is 
to provide new and enhanced penalties and legal remedies for all 
types of organized criminal behavior including sophisticated 
white-collar schemes like that perpetrated here. United States 
v. Cauble. 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 465 
U.S. 1005 (1984). Therefore, UPUA like its federal counterpart, 
should be broadly interpreted in order to effectuate these 
remedial purposes. £££ United States v. TurkettS/ 452 U.S. 576, 
587 (1981) (Congress directed that RICO statute "be liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"). The 
magistrate's dismissal of the UPUA charge in this case, fails to 
recognize these broad remedial goals. 
B. Bind Over Should Occur Unless the Evidence Is 
Wholly Lacking and Incapable of Reasonable 
Inference to Prove the Charged Offenses 
The dismissal order is also inconsistent with the 
liberal bind over standard. Indeed, the probable cause standard 
for criminal bind over is not the equivalent of the reasonable 
doubt standard applicable in a criminal trial, nor even the 
preponderance standard applicable in civil cases. State v. 
Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Rather, it requires 
only wa quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of 
25 
the case to the trier of fact." Id. (quoting State v. Anderson. 
612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980)). Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
directs magistrates to view preliminary hearing evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution and to resolve all 
inferences in the prosecution's favor. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 
1229. This means that even "close calls" should result in a 
determination to bind over for trial. Id. at 1230. Indeed, it 
is presumed that prosecution evidence will only strengthen by 
time of trial. Id. at 1229 (quoting Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 
510 (Okl.Cr. 1986)). Therefore, magistrates are directed to bind 
criminal defendants over for trial Mu]nless the evidence is 
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove 
some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim[.]" IdT 
(quoting Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983) (setting 
out standard for directed verdict in civil case)). 
Although the magistrate invoked the probable cause 
standard in this case, he failed to properly apply it. While the 
magistrate made specific factual findings regarding the existence 
of defendant's investment advisor business, and/or his 
association with the registered and unregistered businesses he 
purported to represent (R. 459-464, see addendum A), the 
magistrate failed to draw the further reasonable inferences that 
this evidence constituted sufficient indicia of a UPUA enterprise 
(Id.). This failure constitutes error as a matter of law. Id. 
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Accord People v. Lewis. 791 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Colo Ct. App. 1989), 
cert, denied, (April 9, 1990) (failure to draw all permissible 
inferences and view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution constitutes error as a matter of law). 
C. Defendant's Sole Proprietorship Constitutes 
Sufficient Indicia of a UPUA Enterprise 
Consistent with the remedial aims of UPUA, an 
enterprise is broadly defined as "any individual, sole 
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and 
includes illicit as well as licit entites." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-1602(1) (1995). Accordingly, the State presented evidence 
regarding the probable existence of two alternative enterprises: 
1) Defendant's investment advisor business, Applied Financial 
Concepts, which is discussed under this heading, and/or 2) an 
association-in-fact enterprise consisting of defendant, and the 
various registered and unregistered businesses he purported to 
represent, which is discussed infra, under heading D (R. 381-82, 
424-38) . Significantly, the magistrate found that the investment 
advisor business existed and facilitated defendant's securities 
fraud scam (R. 459-464, see addendum A). The magistrate also 
found that defendant used various registered and unregistered 
businesses to establish the bank accounts wherein he deposited 
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the proceeds of his securities scam (Id.). However, the 
magistrate ultimately rejected both of the State's enterprise 
theories, concluding that there was "no probable cause to suggest 
that defendant's use of his investment advisor business, Applied 
Financial Concepts, and his use of the various licit and illicit 
"dbas" in establishing the checking accounts wherein he deposited 
the physicians' checks demonstrated the existence of an 
enterprise" (R. 464-65, see addendum A). Rather, the magistrate 
concluded that defendant's investment advisor business and/or 
association with the various registered and unregistered 
businesses simply constituted further evidence in support of the 
pattern element (Id.). 
Turning to the State's first theory, that defendant's 
investment advisor business constituted the UPUA enterprise, the 
magistrate's conclusion suggests that defendant cannot be both 
the UPUA defendant and the UPUA enterprise. This conclusion is 
inconsistent with the broad UPUA definition of enterprise which 
expressly includes "any individual or sole proprietorship." 
Section 76-10-1602(1) (emphasis added). Indeed, the non-
exclusive term "any" reasonably contemplates that both defendant 
and non-defendant individuals and/or sole proprietorships may be 
named as the UPUA enterprise. See State v. Bowen. 413 So.2d 798, 
799 (Fla. App. 1982) (interpreting similar enterprise definition 
and deeming it significant that the legislature could have easily 
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"narrowed" the definition "by supplanting 'any' with 'another'"), 
review denied. 424 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1983). 
Further, at least one federal district court suggests 
that an individual defendant may be Jboth the RICO defendant and 
the RICO enterprise under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), which corresponds 
with UPUA subsection 76-10-1603 (1). See United States v. Pi 
Caro. 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting in dicta that an 
individual defendant who used income derived from a pattern of 
racketeering activity in the operation of an enterprise (himself) 
can be both the liable 'person' and the 'enterprise' for purposes 
of criminal prosecution under subsection (a) of federal RICO 
statute), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986). See also United 
States v. Yonan. 622 F.Supp. 721, 728 (D.C. 111. 1985) ("Congress 
could rationally have decided an individual who engages in a 
'pattern of racketeering activity' and puts his or her ill-gotten 
gains to work in his or her interstate-commerce-affecting 
business (a sole proprietorship) should be criminally 
responsible" under RICO subsection (a)). The DiCaro and Yonan 
courts' suggestions that an individual defendant with a sole 
proprietorship may be charged as both the defendant and the 
enterprise for purposes of RICO subsection (a), is consistent 
with the majority view that a defendant corporation may be both 
the RICO defendant and the RICO enterprise. See, e.g.. Schofield 
v. First Commodity Corp.. 793 F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1986); 
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B.F. Hirsch v. Enriaht Refining Co. Inc., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3rd 
Cir. 1984); Busby v. Crown Supply. Inc.. 896 F.2d 833, 841 (4th 
Cir. 1990), (overruling United States v. Computer Sciences Corp.. 
689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1105 
(1983)); In re Burzynski. 989 F.2d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Haroco. Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co.. 747 F.2d 
384, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd. 473 U.S. 606 (1985); 
Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Sery-Well Furniture Co.. 806 F.2d 
1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1986). 
The validity of defendant's dual role under UPUA 
subsection (3) is perhaps a closer question. As a consequence of 
the "employed by or associated with" language in the 
corresponding RICO subsection (c), the majority of federal courts 
have concluded that the individual and/or corporation cannot be 
both the defendant and the enterprise when charged thereunder. 
See, e.g. Schofield. 793 F.2d at 29 (citing cases); Haroco. 47 
F.2d at 400 (noting language in section 1962(c), unlike 1962(a) 
and 1962(b), requires "that the liable person be 'employed by or 
associated with any enterprise,'" which language "appears to 
contemplate a person distinct from the enterprise under section 
1962(c)") .10 
10
 At least one jurisdiction has held otherwise. See 
United States v. Hartley. 678 F.2d 961, 986-88 (11th Cir. 1982), 
reh'g denied. 698 F.2d 852 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, denied. 459 
U.S. 1170 (1983) and 459 U.S. 1183 (1983). In Hartley, the 
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Significantly, in an opinion decided after Haroco, the 
Seventh Circuit found a sole proprietorship to be a separate 
entity for purposes of a RICO subsection (c) prosecution. 
McCullouah v. Suter. 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985). Recognizing 
the general rule set forth in Haroco. the Suter court noted that 
a sole proprietorship that had no employees or other associates 
may not qualify as a separate entity for purposes of RICO 
subsection (c). The court further noted, however, that Suter had 
several people working for him and this fact made his company a 
separate enterprise. Id. at 144. Additionally, the court noted 
that even "if Suter were all by himself and yet adopted the 
corporate form for his activity," he might well be properly 
prosecuted under subsection (c). Id. "If the one-man band 
incorporates, it gets some legal protections from the corporate 
form, such as limited liability; and it is just this sort of 
legal shield for illegal activity that RICO tries to pierce." 
Id. The court concluded that with regards to a sole 
proprietorship enterprise under subsection (c), the "only 
important thing is that it be either formally (as when there is 
Eleventh Circuit noted that the "legal existence" of a 
corporation satisfies the enterprise element of a RICO charge. 
Id. Therefore, because a corporation is separate and distinct 
from the pattern element, the Eleventh Circuit held that absent 
any express prohibition against the dual role, "[a] corporation 
may be simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise under 
RICO," subsection (c). Id. 
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incorporation) or practically (as when there are other people 
besides the proprietor working in the organization) separable 
from the individual." JJL_ Accord United States v, Benny, 786 
F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir.) (applying Seventh Circuit analysis to 
sole proprietor/RICO defendant who either employed or associated 
with four other defendants), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1017 (1986). 
At least one state appellate court has analyzed similar 
legislation and determined that its state legislature intended 
"to direct the thrust of the RICO act against an individual 
associating with himself." Bowen, 413 So.2d at 799. As noted 
previously, Florida, like Utah, includes within its definition of 
enterprise, "'any' individual or sole proprietorship." Id. If 
the Florida legislature had not intended to reach individuals 
like the sole proprietor/defendant in Bowen, the Florida court 
reasoned it could have easily "narrowed" the definition of 
enterprise "by supplanting 'any' with 'another.'" Id. 
Consequently, the Bowen court determined that it was not 
necessary for Bowen, the sole proprietor of a mini-storage 
warehouse, to have associated with a second person or legal 
entity in order to be charged under Florida's equivalent to UPUA 
subsection (3). Id. While Bowen apparently had no employees, 
unlike the sole proprietors at issue in McCullough and Benny, the 
Florida courts interpreting Bowen have determined that the 
warehouse constituted a sufficient "de facto entity" with which 
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Bowen was deemed to have associated himself. See State v. Nishi. 
521 So.2d 252, 254 (Fla. App.), review denied, 531 S.2d 1355 
(Fla. 1988); State v. Wilson, 596 So.2d 775,781 (Fla. App. 1992). 
Here, as in Bowen and McCullouah. defendant's 
investment advisor business was not formally incorporated; 
however, the State presented sufficient evidence to suggest that 
it was a separate M e facto" entity for purposes of UPUA 
subsection (3). Significantly, the magistrate found that 
defendant clearly represented he was soliciting investments 
through his investment advisor business (R. 459, see addendum A). 
This finding is well supported in the record (R. see, e.g.. R. 
897, 1025, 1062, 1195)."• Additionally, evidence adduced below 
but not expressly referenced in the magistrate's findings 
establishes that defendant assured at least two doctors that his 
''company," had performed the "due diligence" on the offered stock 
(see, e.g., R. 872, 978). The evidence further establishes that 
defendant encouraged hesitant doctors to invest by telling them 
that his company was also making a particular investment (see 
e.g.. R. 897, 1015, 1025, 1052). For example, defendant told Dr. 
Robinson that because defendant's company, Applied Financial 
Concepts, had helped Sourceline Capital to establish in Utah, 
11
 While no physical evidence was introduced, the State's 
investigator testified that the Applied Financial Concepts name 
had been registered for business purposes (R. 1149). 
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defendant's company and its clients had been given an opportunity 
to participate as equity partners in Sourceline Capitals7 
business ventures and could expect as much as a 35% return on any 
investment (R. 1014-16). 
In addition to these verbal representations, the 
evidence established that defendant corresponded with doctors 
Nelson and Robinson on tangible Applied Financial Concepts 
letterhead (Supp. R. 1416-1417, 1621, Exh. ## 43-44, 71). One of 
these letters indicated defendant's continued association with 
Richards Investments and was also typed by someone other than 
defendant, suggesting that defendant continued to belong to an 
investment group and that defendant had at least one employee 
(see Exh. # 71) . 
Based on the above, the magistrate's finding that the 
investment advisor business existed, together with the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, provide probable cause for the 
existence of a UPUA enterprise. See Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1230 
(directing magistrate's to resolve all inferences in the 
prosecution's favor). Indeed, defendant operated and/or 
maintained his investment advisor business for purposes of UPUA 
subsections (1) and (2) when he deposited his ill-gotten proceeds 
into the defendant-controlled accounts and caused these funds to 
be transferred between accounts, including his investment advisor 
business account (see R. 463, see addendum A). See Blue Cross 
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of Western Pennsylvania. 680 F. Supp. 195, 199 (W.D. Pa. 1988) 
(finding that same liability analysis applies to both RICO 
subsections (a) and (b) on the ground that use of income from 
racketeering activity to operate enterprise can also constitute 
maintaining one's interest in an enterprise). Further, applying 
McCullouah, Bowen and their progeny, the above evidence also 
constitutes sufficient indicia of a defacto entity separate from 
defendant and with which he could associate for purposes of 
subsection (3). Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1230. 
Finally, defendant represented the existence of a 
legitimate investment advisor business, suggesting that his 
business was involved with an investment group, and likely 
employed a secretary. The broad remedial purposes of the UPUA 
statute persuade that defendant should not escape enterprise 
liability solely because he was sophisticated enough to avoid 
formal incorporation. See Turkette. 452 U.S. at 591 ("RICO is 
equally applicable to a criminal enterprise that has no 
legitimate dimension or has yet to acquire one.")} Schofield v. 
First Commodity Corp. of Boston. 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(reading Turkette "to say that where the language in RICO permits 
liability against a culpable entity, courts should find that such 
liability exists"). 
D. Defendant'a Association-in-Fact With the 
Registered and Unregistered Businesses He 
Purported to Represent Constitutes a UPUA 
Enterprise 
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Even assuming this Court deems defendant's investment 
advisor business insufficient indicia of an enterprise for bind 
over under any UPUA subsection, the State presented evidence of 
an association-in-fact enterprise between defendant and the 
businesses which he used to establish the bank accounts wherein 
he deposited the proceeds of his securities scam. The 
magistrate's dismissal of this enterprise theory similarly 
constitutes an error of law. Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1230. 
An association-in-fact enterprise uis proved by 
evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by 
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing 
unit." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. As noted previously, a UPUA 
enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated 
in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well 
as licit entities. Section 76-10-1602 (1). Here, the magistrate 
found that defendant used various registered and unregistered 
businesses to establish the disguised checking accounts wherein 
he deposited his ill-gotten proceeds (R. 460, see addendum A). 
However, the magistrate erroneously failed to conclude that 
defendant's relationship with these businesses constituted an 
association-in-fact enterprise (see R. 464, see addendum A). 
Instead, the magistrate concluded that defendant's use of the 
businesses merely constituted more pattern evidence (Id.). In so 
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concluding, the magistrate overlooked critical evidence 
concerning the nature of the businesses associated with 
defendant. 
Specifically, at least three of the business were 
connected to individuals other than defendant. As noted 
previously, Tempus Utile was a limited corporation involving 
three other individuals (R. 1165, Supp. R. 1332-1334, Exh. #7). 
Further, the FSB account corresponding to the Sourceline business 
was co-owned by defendant and Jerry Sheets (R. 1124-25), and the 
Bank One account corresponding to the Cross Country Management 
business was co-owned by Ed Parker and Myron Abbott (R. 1157). 
The magistrate's failure to give these facts proper 
consideration is significant because none of the above 
individuals are alleged to have participated in the fraudulent 
securities activity for which defendant was previously bound 
over. Therefore, this evidence is not properly viewed as 
buttressing the pattern element; rather, it goes to the 
establishment of the separate enterprise element. Indeed, this 
evidence establishes that the magistrate erred in concluding that 
the defendant-controlled bank accounts were mere extensions of 
defendant and/or his investment advisor business. While 
defendant primarily controlled the bank accounts, his connections 
to individuals associated with the accounts establishes that he 
was not operating as a strictly "one man show." Compare Guidry 
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v. Bank of La Place. 740 F.Supp. 1208, 1212 (E.D. La. 1990) 
(holding that bank account in and of itself was an inanimate 
object which could not constitute RICO enterprise), aff'd as 
m££i£i£d, 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992) with United States v. 
Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 656 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting RICO 
defendant's claim that he was not sufficiently separable from 
businesses he incorporated for purposes of forming an 
association-in-fact enterprise therewith, on the ground that the 
associated corporations were far from wone-man shows," and were 
themselves legal entities), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989). 
These overlooked facts are also significant because an 
association-in-fact enterprise can consist of both individuals 
and corporations. Accordingly, defendant's relationship with his 
Tempus Utile partners alone constitutes an association-in-fact 
enterprise. See Feldman, 853 F.2d at 655-56 (holding that an 
association-in-fact enterprise can consist of individuals and 
corporations). The corporate nature of Tempus Utile alone is 
also sufficient to establish that enterprise here was separate 
from defendant's the pattern of unlawful conduct. See River City 
Markets v. Fleming Foods West, 960 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 
1992) (noting that "one can associate with a group of which he is 
a member, with the member and the group remaining distinct 
entities"). Indeed, other than their connection to the bank 
accounts wherein defendant deposited his ill-gotten proceeds, 
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defendant's Tempus Utile partners, as well as Sheets, Abbott and 
Parker, have no alleged involvement in defendant's pattern of 
securities act violations. See Chang v. Cheng. 80 F.3d 1293, 
1300 (9th Cir. 1996) ("the involvement of a corporation, which 
has an existence separate from its participation in the 
racketeering activity, can satisfy the enterprise element's 
requirement of a separate structure"); United States v. Kirk. 844 
F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir.) (holding that where government presented 
evidence of several lawful entities existing separately from the 
racketeering activities, "the existence of a corporation fulfills 
the requirements of an ascertainable structure apart from the 
predicate racketeering activity"), cert, denied. 488 U.S. 890 
(1988) . 
As for the ongoing organization of the association, 
that is adequately established by defendant's common control of 
the accounts--he was the sole signatory on all but the Cross 
Country Management accounts. Turkette. 452 U.S. at 579 (noting 
that "common thread" to association in fact enterprise was 
Turkette's "leadership"). Significantly, although defendant did 
not own the Cross Country Management account, he made deposits 
thereto and corresponding amounts were subsequently transferred 
to a defendant-controlled account (R. 1157; Supp. R. 1533-1540, 
Exh. ##63-63A). Thus, the evidence suggests a decision making 
mechanism controlled by defendant. Sanders. 928 F.2d 940, 943 
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(finding indicia of an ongoing organization was established with 
evidence of a "decision-making framework or mechanism for 
controlling the group"); Chang. 80 F.3d at 1299 (holding that 
organizational structure of an enterprise "should provide "some 
mechanism for controlling and directing the affairs of the group 
on an ongoing, rather than an ad hoc, basis'"). 
Finally, defendant's deposits and transfers between the 
accounts also serve to establish the continuity of the 
association-in-fact enterprise. Indeed, the commingling of the 
accounts created a shared financial connection between them. See 
Feldman. 853 F.2d at 647 (deeming shared financial connections 
significant to establishment of a continuing enterprise). These 
transactions were multitudinous, not isolated, and are detailed 
in the charts and spreadsheets prepared by the State's 
investigator (R. 463, see addendum A and Supp. R. 1433-1523, 
1525-1540, Exh. ## 53-59A, 61-63A) . See McGrath. 749 P.2d at 637 
(deeming it significant that drug trafficking enterprise 
conducted more than one "isolated transaction"). 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the UPUA 
charge as Pledger requires, he above facts establish an 
association-in-fact enterprise for the purpose of hiding 
defendant's securities fraud proceeds. Defendant's participation 
in the enterprise, combined with his acts constituting a pattern 
of securities act violations, establish the necessary elements of 
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the UPUA charge under all three UPUA subsections. The 
magistrate's failure to so recognize constitutes error as a 
matter of law. Lewis, 791 P.2d at 1154. 
POINT II 
THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
THAT DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT IN DEPOSITING THE 
PROCEEDS OF HIS SECURITIES FRAUD SCAM INTO 
DISGUISED ACCOUNTS, AND/OR HIS COMMINGLING OF 
FUNDS IN THESE ACCOUNTS INDICATED AN INTENT 
TO CONCEAL THE PROCEEDS UNDER THE MONEY 
LAUNDERING STATUTE 
A. Defendant's Concealed Bank Deposits 
Constitute Sufficient Evidence of Money 
Laundering for Bind Over Purposes 
The State charged defendant with ten violations of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1995), which provides in pertinent part 
as follows: 
(1) A person commits the offense of money 
laundering by financial transaction if, 
knowing that the property involved in a 
financial transaction represents proceeds of 
some form of unlawful activity, he conducts 
or attempts to conduct a financial 
transaction which in fact involves the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity: . . 
. (b) knowing that the transaction is 
designed in whole or in part to: (i) conceal 
or disguise the nature, the location, the 
source, the ownership or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity[.]12 
12
 The State also charged defendant under subsection 
(1)(a)("to promote the unlawful activity"); however, because the 
prosecution's argument in the preliminary hearing court was 
premised primarily on its theory that defendant intentionally 
concealed or disguised the nature, location, source, ownership, 
or control of the property, the State makes no argument under 
subsection (1)(a) for purposes of this appeal. 
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The "specified unlawful activity" pertinent to the 
instant case is the 24 securities act violations for which 
defendant was bound over for trial (R. 465-65, see addendum A). 
Additionally, one "conducts" a "transaction" for purposes of the 
money laundering statute by making a bank deposit, withdrawal 
and/or transfer between bank accounts. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1902 (2), (11) (1995) (£££ addendum B) . Accord United States v. 
Garcia-Emanuel. 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994) ( "A 
variety of types of evidence" have been found "supportive . . . 
of an intent to disguise or conceal" for purposes of the federal 
money laundering statute, including "depositing illegal profits 
in the bank account of a legitimate business [.]"); United States 
v. Reynolds. 64 F.3d 292, 297 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A financial 
transaction includes making a deposit into an account [.]"), cert. 
denied. 116 S.Ct. 969 (1996).13 
Utah's money laundering statute has yet to be 
interpreted by its appellate courts. Because the statute 
essentially tracks the pertinent language of the federal money 
laundering statute, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) (1996) 
(prohibiting knowingly conducting a financial transaction 
involving the proceeds of specified unlawful activity with the 
intent to "conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity"), interpretative federal case law 
is persuasive. See, e.g. , State v. Hunt. 781 P.2d 473 (Utah 
App. 1989) (applying federal law to the Utah Interception of 
Communication Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-l to 77-23a-16 (Supp. 
1989), noting that the Utah act was based on Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2510 to 2520), cert, denied. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). 
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Defendant's conduct in this case plainly fits within 
the parameters of the money laundering statute. The magistrate 
expressly found that defendant, upon receiving the victims' 
checks, deposited them into different checking accounts which 
"bore the name of the security offered the victim," but which 
defendant in fact owned or controlled (R. 461, see addendum A). 
The magistrate also found that defendant deposited a $25,000 
check from Dr. Nelson into the Cross County Management (CCM) 
account over which he (defendant) had no signatory authority; 
however, one of the CCM account signatories subsequently issued a 
check for $25,000 to F.C. Finance, an account over which 
defendant maintained sole control (R. 1157). Thus, within a week 
of depositing the $25,000 into the CCM account defendant regained 
sole control of Dr. Nelson's money (R. 463, see addendum A). 
Having made these deposits, defendant told each victim 
that his money had been invested in a particular company and that 
the money was not in his (defendant's) control (R. 463, see 
addendum A). The magistrate found that when asked, defendant 
evaded and otherwise refused to answer the victims questions 
regarding the location, nature and control of their money (Id.). 
Although some victims' actually received alleged interest 
payments on their investments, these payments were received in 
the form of cashiers' checks drawn on a bank and were not from 
the company with which the victim had purportedly invested (Id.). 
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Finally, the magistrate found that defendant personally withdrew 
the proceeds and/or made multiple transfers of the proceeds 
between his other controlled accounts and other entities (Id.). 
The magistrate's findings provide "sufficient" support 
for the money laundering charges in this case. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
at 1229-30. The reasonable inferences from the magistrate's 
findings and bind over order on the securities act violations are 
1) that defendant knew the monies he deposited were proceeds of 
his fraudulent investment scam, and 2) that these deposits were 
designed in whole or in part to conceal the ill-gotten proceeds 
from the victims. See Section 76-10-1903. 
Ironically, the magistrate determined the opposite, 
concluding that there was "no probable cause to establish that 
defendant intentionally concealed the proceeds," based on a 
perceived lack of evidence concerning "various transactions 
between the defendant controlled accounts and other entities 
after the deposits of the physicians' proceeds into the 
defendant-controlled accounts" (R. 465, see addendum A) (emphasis 
added). In so ruling, the magistrate effectively required proof 
concerning the ultimate use of the proceeds which proof is simply 
not an element of money laundering. See Section 76-10-1903. 
Contrary to the magistrate's reasoning, disguised 
and/or concealed bank deposits constitute proof of concealment 
for money laundering purposes--beyond even a reasonable doubt. 
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See Reynolds, 64 F.3d at 297 (upholding Reynolds' conviction for 
money laundering upon proof that he instructed his 
secretary/codefendant to misdirect local UMWA dues to her 
personal bank account and to alter financial records so that the 
International UMWA would believe the local district's income from 
dues was less that what it actually received); United States v. 
Jackson. 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding money 
laundering conviction where defendant, a minister/drug dealer, 
deposited his drug sale proceeds into church account, but treated 
the funds as his own); United Stfrte? v, Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 
1155-56 (2nd Cir. 1995) (affirming money laundering conviction 
based on evidence that Holmes deposited embezzled Union funds 
into his personal bank account and later withdrew some of it); 
U.S. v. Posters N Things LTD. 969 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1992) 
(upholding money laundering conviction where defendant deposited 
both legal and illegal proceeds into one bank account from which 
she then made personal withdrawals), aff'd. 511 U.S. 513 (1994); 
United States v. Sutera. 933 F.2d 641, 648 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding money laundering conviction where defendant deposited 
illegal gambling proceeds into account named for his legitimate 
restaurant business and caused checks to be drawn on the account 
in the restaurant's name which he used to pay his personal bills 
and gambling-related expenses). 
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While the evidence in Jackson, Holmes, Posters N 
Things. and Sutera established that those defendants also made 
subsequent particular personal uses of the deposited illegal 
proceeds, such evidence is not necessarily critical to the 
establishment of an intent to conceal proceeds for purposes of a 
money laundering conviction. See, e.g.. Reynolds. 64 F.3d at 297 
(upholding money laundering conviction based solely on evidence 
that Union dues were criminally misdirected and deposited into 
codefendants' personal bank account). See also Section 76-10-
1903. Rather, the emphasis in money laundering cases is on the 
intent to conceal illegal proceeds. Garcia-Emanual. 14 F.3d at 
1476 (noting that federal money laundering statute is a 
"concealment statute--not a spending statute"). Indeed, the 
Sutera court emphasized that to successfully prosecute a money 
laundering conviction, necessitating proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, *[t]he jury simply ha[d] to find that Sutera intended to 
hide the gambling proceeds." Sutera. 933 P.2d at 648 (emphasis 
added). See also Posters N Things, 969 F.2d at 661 (emphasizing 
that a reasonable juror could infer an intent to disguise the 
nature or source of unlawful proceeds where defendant 
indistinguishably commingled in one account both legal and 
illegal receipts). 
Further, there is no requirement that a money 
laundering defendant be particularly adroit in concealing illegal 
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proceeds. Sutera. 933 F.2d at 648 (noting that while Sutera 
could have "better hidden" illegal gambling proceeds by • 
commingling the funds with legitimate restaurant receipts, "the 
money laundering statute [did] not require the jury to find that 
Sutera [had done] a good job of laundering proceeds."); Jackson. 
935 F.2d at 842 (fact that Jackson's "deception was ultimately 
unsuccessful, and even that it was relatively easy for 
investigators to pierce, does not mean that it falls beyond the 
statute's reach"). 
Thus, an intent to conceal proceeds for purposes of the 
money laundering statute is established when, as here, the 
nature, location, ownership and or control of those proceeds is 
concealed and/or disguised by depositing them into shell 
accounts. It necessarily follows that such evidence will suffice 
as probable cause for bind over purposes. Pledger. 896 P.2d at 
1230. 
B. Defendant'8 Transfers of Proceeds Between His 
Various Controlled and Uncontrolled Accounts 
Supports Money Laundering Charges 
Even if evidence concerning defendant's ultimate use of 
the proceeds is deemed critical evidence for bind over purposes, 
sufficient indication of such was introduced below. 
For example, the evidence established and the 
magistrate found that the spreadsheets prepared by the State's 
investigator reflected that defendant personally withdrew 
47 
proceeds and also transferred proceeds between his controlled 
accounts and other entities which he did not control (R. 461-64, 
see addendum A) (see Supp. R. 1432-1540, Exh. ## 53-59A, 60-63A). 
While the investigator's oral testimony could possibly have been 
more detailed as to some of these transactions, the spreadsheets 
provide abundant indication that such withdrawals and transfers 
in fact occurred (Id.). See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 
1374, 1386 (5th Cir. 1995) (Mm]oving money through a large 
number of accounts has, in the light of other evidence, also been 
found to support the design element of [money laundering], even 
when all the accounts to which the defendant transferred the 
money and from which he withdrew it were in his own name."), 
cert, denied, 116 S.Ct. 675 (1995). To the extent the 
magistrate's dismissal suggests that the State was required to 
segregate transactions involving illegal proceeds from any 
possibly legitimate transactions, such is not required by the 
majority of federal courts considering the question. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 563, 570 (10th Cir. 
1992)(holding government not required to show that no legitimate 
funds were deposited along with unlawful proceeds on the ground 
that w[s]uch an interpretation would allow individuals to avoid 
prosecution simply by commingling legitimate funds with proceeds 
of crime," and thereby "defeat the very purpose of the money-
laundering statutes"); Garcia. 37 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1994) 
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(holding that "[i]t is unnecessary to attempt to segregate in 
some manner the tainted funds from the commingled account."); 
Jackson, 935 F.2d at 84 0 (holding that government is not required 
to trace origin of all deposited sums in order to determine 
exactly which funds were used for what transaction); United 
States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (refusing to 
read money laundering statute uin a manner that would reward the 
more creative money-launderer by allowing him to escape liability 
altogether by commingling assets or otherwise disguising the 
source of his funds"), cert, denied, U.S. , 115 S.Ct. 915 
(1995); United States v, Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 977 (4th Cir.) 
("govenrment is not reqiured to prove that no 'untainted' funds 
were involved, or that funds used in the transaction were 
exclusively derived from the specified unlawful activity"), cert. 
denied. 115 S.Ct. 459 (1994). Cf. United States v. Heath. 970 
F.2d 1397, 1404 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that government need not 
trace source of funds used in each individual transaction where 
aggregate of funds transferred exceeded "untainted" money in 
account), cert, denied gyb UQW, Cheng v. United States. 509 U.S. 
1004 (1993); Willey. 57 F.3d at 1386 (holding that evidence that 
defendant commingled proceeds with legitimate business was 
sufficient to support money laundering charge). 
Thus, remembering that the State's evidence is presumed 
to strengthen by time of trial, the above evidence supports 
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defendant's intent to conceal the proceeds for bind over 
purposes. Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229-30. It may be that evidence 
regarding defendant's ultimate and precise use of the proceeds 
will assist a jury to reach a guilty verdict in this case, but 
such is not a required element of the money laundering statute. 
See Section 76-10-1903. Rather, all that is required is proof 
that defendant intended to conceal his ill-gotten proceeds by 
means of a financial transcation, in this case, by depositing the 
proceeds into concealed bank accounts. Id.: Section 76-10-
1902(2) (11) . Accordingly, the magistrate erred as a matter of 
law when it dismissed these charges based on its concerns about 
the ultimate use of the proceeds. Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1230. 
The dismissal order should be overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
The order dismissing the pattern of unlawful activity 
and money laundering charges should be reversed and the case 
remanded for entry of an order binding defendant over for trial 
on these charges, together with the 24 securities act violations 
previously bound over. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this^L day of November, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLENN EARL LLOYD, II, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 941020860 
Judge Michael Hutchings 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on November 13-16,1995 and 
January 3,1996 before the Honorable Michael Hutchings. The Defendant, Glenn Earl Lloyd II, 
was present and represented by Gilbert Athay and Lonnie DeLand. The State of Utah was 
represented by Robert K. Hunt. The Court, being folly advised in the premises, hereby enters its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as they pertain to counts 25 through 35 of the information 
v \f «.' t: tf i 
as follows1: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that, in order to bind over a charge under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, et. seq.), the State must demonstrate 
probable cause that defendant engaged in at least three episodes of unlawful activity. The 
Act specifically includes securities fraud as well as the sale of unregistered securities as 
unlawful acts. (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(1) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 (4) 
(rrr)). 
2. In order to bind over a charge, the Court finds that the State must demonstrate probable 
cause that defendant maintained, established, operated, conducted or participated in an 
enterprise, which is defined as "a continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging in a 
course of conduct." State v. McGrath 749 P.2d 631, 637 (Utah 1988) quoting from 
United States v. Dickens 695 F.2d 765, 773 (3d Cir. 1982), cert Denied, 460 U.S. 1092 
(1983). An enterprise is "any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, 
business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." 
1
 By agreement between the parties and the court, these findings of facts and 
conclusions of law address only the ten counts which were not bound over to District Court. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(1). Because "the 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of 
racketeering activity'" the evidence must demonstrate probable cause that the enterprise 
is "an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." l i at 
637. 
The Court finds that, in order to bind over the defendant based on allegations of money 
laundering, the State must present evidence that the defendant conducted a financial 
transaction, 
if, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents proceeds of 
some form of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts to conduct a financial transaction 
which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity: 
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to: 
(i) conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (1990). Securities fraud and the sale of unregistered 
securities are "specified unlawful activities." (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1902(9)) 
The uncontroverted facts presented at the preliminary hearing were as follows: 
a. During all times relevant to the charges presented (1991 through 1994), defendant 
maintained an investment advisor business entitled Applied Financial Concepts 
through which he gave investment advice, assisted individuals in investing their 
money and transferred individuals' money to various investments. 
b. The defendant represented himself as an investment advisor to the following 
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individuals: Dr. Stephen Bennett, Dr. Roger Sheffield, Dr. William Ellingson, Dr. 
Elmo Gruwell, Dr. Ronald Saunders, Dr. Joseph Nelson, Dr. Paul Robinson, Dr. 
Wendell Gadd and Dr. Alan Rappleye. 
In his capacity as an investment advisor, defendant personally met with each of 
the above-referenced individuals to discuss investing in one or more of the 
following companies: F.C. Leasing, CC Management, Cross Country 
Management, Peak Strategy Management, Sourceline Capital, AFC Inter-Cap, 
Internal Capitalization Partnership, Tempus Utile, FC Finance, and AFC. 
In each meeting, defendant described the above-referenced companies as existing, 
viable companies doing business in the State of Utah. 
The defendant told each physician that his investments were low risk and that his 
principal would be returned in a period of one to three years and during that time 
period, the physicians would receive monthly or quarterly interest payments, 
ranging from eight to fourteen percent. 
After the physicians were offered the securities, the physicians agreed to invest in 
the described business and, in each instance, physically handed the defendant a 
check issued to the specific business in which they had decided to invest. 
The defendant opened the following checking accounts through the use of 
registered and unregistered dbas: Sourceline Capital (Draper Bank ("Draper") # 
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91-02679-9), FC Finance (First Security Bank ("FSB") # 216-26776-10), FC 
Leasing (FSB # 216-25076-16), AFC (FSB # 216-26091-15), Peak Strategy 
Management (FSB #216-1019290), Cross Country Management. (Bank One # 
1162-8004), AFC Inter-Cap (Zions Bank # 015-352206), Tempus Utile (First 
Interstate Bank # 26-03050-2), CC Management (FSB # 216-10192-82), and 
Internal Capitalization Management (FSB # 216-00229-15). The defendant was 
the sole signatory on these accounts and defendant was the only person who 
deposited or withdrew money out of these accounts. 
There were two Sourceline Capital accounts, one at Draper Bank and one at First 
Security Bank. The Sourceline Capital account at Draper Bank listed Jerry 
Sheets as a signatory and is not relevant to the State's money laundering charge. 
However, the First Security Bank Sourceline Capital account (FSB #216-00015-
88) was established by the defendant and he was the sole signatory. 
After the defendant personally received the victims' checks, he deposited the 
checks into the above-referenced accounts which he owned and controlled. 
These accounts bore the name of the security offered the victim so the money 
could be deposited into that account. The deposits occurred as follows: 
Dr. Sheffield's $10,000.00 to "Sourceline Capital" (FSB #216-00015-88) 
Dr. Nelson's $40,394.00 to FC Finance (FSB # 216-26776-10) 
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* Dr, Rappleye"s $29,250, Dr. Saunders' $ $25,000.00, Dr. Ellingson's $20,000.00, 
Dr. Bennett's $20,000.00, and Dr. Gadd's $15,000.00 to FC Leasing (FSB #216-
25076-16) 
* Dr. Rappleye's $ 10,000.00, Dr. Gruwell's $ 10,000.00, and Dr. Nelson's 
$10,000.00 to AFC (FSB # 216-26091-15) 
* Dr. Nelson's $70,000.00 and Dr. Bennett's $20,625 to Peak Strategy 
Management (FSB #216-1019290) 
* Dr. Nelson's $25,000.00 and Dr. Bennett's $ 10,000.00 to Cross Country 
Management. (Bank One # 1162-8004) 
* Dr. Bennett's $20,000.00 and Dr. Saunders, $ 15,000.00 to AFC Inter-Cap (Zions 
Bank #015-352206) 
* Dr Saunders' $25,000.00 to Tempus Utile (First Interstate Bank # 26-03050-2) 
* Dr. Nelson's $90,000.00 to CC Management (FSB # 216-10192-82) 
* Dr. Bennett's $15,000.00 and Dr. Gadd's $15,000.00 to Internal Capitalization 
Management (FSB # 216-10192-82). 
j . Cross Country Management at Bank One listed Myron Lee Abbott and Edward C. 
Parker as signatories. However, Dr. Nelson's $25,000.00 was the opening deposit 
in that account on July 20,1993. On that same day, $10.00 cash was also placed 
in the account. On July 27,1993, Myron Abbott issued a check for $25,000.00 
from the Cross Country Account to FC Finance, an account over which the 
defendant had sole control. Other than these three transactions, no other money 
went in or out of the Cross Country Management account during the week of July 
20 - 27,1993. Within one week, the defendant gained control over Dr. Nelson's 
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$25,000.00, which Dr. Nelson was told would be invested in a business entitled 
Cross Country Management. 
k. At all times relevant hereto, the defendant told the victims that their proceeds 
were invested in the existing, viable, Utah companies which he initially offered 
them and that the proceeds were not in his control. Defendant refused to answer 
the physicians' questions regarding the proceeds' location, nature and control. 
1. Each time a victim actually received an alleged interest payment on his 
investment, he would receive it in the form of a cashier's check drawn on a bank 
and not from the alleged investment entity or even the defendant-controlled 
account by the same name. 
m. After the physicians' funds were deposited into one or more of the defendant-
controlled accounts, the spreadsheets (Exhibits # 53A - 63A) established that the 
following relevant activity occurred: 1) Funds would be withdrawn and deposited 
in the various defendant-controlled accounts; 2) Funds would be withdrawn from 
the defendant-controlled accounts and deposited into one or more of the 
defendant's personal accounts; 3) Funds would be withdrawn from the 
defendant-controlled accounts and transferred to other entities not controlled by 
the defendant; or, 4) Funds would be deposited into the defendant-controlled 
accounts from other entities not controlled by the defendant. 
7 
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n. The spreadsheets from each defendant-controlled account (Exhibits 53A through 
63A) established and explained the deposit and withdrawal activity which 
occurred specifically between the ten defendant-controlled accounts as well as the 
defendant's personal checking accounts. 
o. However, the State presented no testimony explaining the withdrawal and deposit 
activity in the defendant-controlled accounts relating to entities not controlled or 
established by the defendant such as Star King, Adalyn Financial, Capstone and 
Towers, among others. 
p. Furthermore, the State's witness which testified as to the above-described 
accounts could not tell the Court whether these defendant-controlled accounts 
were interest bearing. 
q. During the time defendant was transferring these funds between his accounts and 
to himself, he continued to maintain his investment advisor company, Applied 
Financial Concepts, and continued to represent himself as an investment advisor. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that since counts one through twenty four have been bound over to 
District Court, probable cause exists to establish evidence of the pattern element required 
under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. 
2. The Court concludes that, as a matter of law, there was no probable cause to suggest that 
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defendant's use of his investment advisor business, Applied Financial Concepts, and his 
use of various licit and illicit dbas in establishing the checking accounts wherein he 
deposited the physicians' checks demonstrated the existence of an enterprise. 
3. The Court concludes that the evidence used to establish the existence of the investment 
advisor company as well as the various dbas is evidence which only further establishes 
and proves the elements of the pattern (the securities fraud and the sale of unregistered 
securities), and not the existence of an enterprise. 
4. In reference to the ten money laundering counts, the Court concludes that there is no 
probable cause to establish that the defendant intentionally concealed the proceeds since 
no evidence was presented to answer the Court's questions as to the various transactions 
which transpired between the defendant-controlled accounts and other entities after the 
deposits of the physicians' proceeds into the defendant-controlled accounts. 
DATED this 
Michael Hutchings 
Circuit Qourt Judge «v 
* * 4 ^sT-" 
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THE COURT, having been fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That counts one through twenty four of the criminal information be bound over to 
District court. 
2. That counts twenty five through thirty five be dismissed. 
DATED this Zip day of J^lU , 1996 
Michael Hutchings 
Circuit Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Gilbert Athay 
Attorney for the Defendant 
10 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ b day of ^ Xf /,UJ n A/t- s~ , 1996,1 caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing "FINDINGS^F FACT Ahtf) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER" to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Gilbert Athay, Esq. 
Loni DeLand, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM B 
76-10-1603 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the 
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, 
any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived 
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of 
Subsection (1), (2), or (3). 
History: C. 1953, i 76-10-1603, enacted as last amended by Laws 1985, ch. 234, § 3, 
by L. 1987, ch. 238, $ 3. relating to unlawful acts and forfeitures, and 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws enacts the present section. 
1987, ch. 238, § 3 repeals former § 76-10-1603, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
670 F. Supp. 920 CD. Utah 1987); State v. 
McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988). 
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443. 
76-10-1603. Unlawful acts. 
ANALYSIS 
Conspiracy. 
Elements. 
Enterprise. 
Pattern of unlawful activity. 
Conspiracy. 
Although conspiracy is one of the enumer-
ated acts of racketeering under { 76-10-1602, it 
is not a separate basis for recovery under this 
•ection but is merely a crime that may qualify 
as one of the predicate acts needed to show a 
pattern of racketeering activity; standing 
alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state a 
cause of action under this section. Bache 
Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins 
Bank & Trust Co., 558 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Utah 
1983). 
Elements. 
Both the "pattern of racketeering [unlawful] 
activity" and "enterprise* elements must be 
established to convict under this section. State 
v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631 (Utah 1988). 
In dismissing plaintiffs' pattern of unlawful 
Activity claim, it was error for the trial court to 
rule that "plaintiffs did not prove the existence 
of three similar instances of unlawful activity 
that involve separate and different entities" 
because the act does not require three separate 
entities and, furthermore, the existence of one 
enterprise is sufficient to invoke liability under 
the act. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 
(Utah 1993). 
Enterprise. 
Evidence established the existence of an "en-
terprise," where defendant and another had an 
ongoing association for the purpose of making 
money from the sale of controlled substances, 
and the two men functioned as a continuing 
unit for a common purpose of engaging in a 
course of conduct. State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 
631 (Utah 1988). 
Indictment and bill of particulars did not 
sufficiently describe factual basis for element of 
enterprise to enable defendant to prepare ad-
equate defense. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 
(Utah 1988). 
Pat tern of unlawful activity. 
A pattern of racketeering activity requires 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS communications fraud is improper. State v. 
Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
El PE nts ^ *^ B sect*0D **** n e v c r Placed upon defendant 
p^f^e the burden to prove the absence of criminal 
w
 intent on his part. See State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 
Culpability. 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
This section requires the state to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that defendant either Elements. 
knew of the falsity, or had a reckless disregard A required element of the crime of communi-
for the truth, of any "pretenses, representa- cations fraud is that the object of the fraud be 
tions, promises, or material omissions" made by proven. State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290 (Utah Ct. 
the defendant Former Subsection (7), making App. 1990). 
absence of knowledge or recklessness an affir-
mative defense, merely emphasized that absent Cited in State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681 (Utah 
either of these mental states, a conviction for Ct. App. 1992). 
PART 19 
MONEY LAUNDERING AND CURRENCY TRANSACTION 
REPORTING 
76-10.1901. Short title. 
This part is known as the Money Laundering and Currency Transaction 
Reporting Act. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1901, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 241, 5 1. 
76-10-1902. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Bank* means each agent, agency, or office in this state of any person 
doing business in any one of the following capacities: 
(a) a commercial bank or trust company organized under the laws 
of this state or of the United States; 
(b) a private bank; 
(c) a savings and loan association or a building and loan association 
organized under the laws of this state or of the United States; 
(d) an insured institution as defined in Section 401 of the National 
Housing Act; 
(e) a savings bank, industrial bank, or other thrift institution; 
(f) a credit union organized under the laws of this state or of the 
United States; or 
(g) any other organization chartered under Title 7 and subject to 
the supervisory authority set forth in that title. 
(2) "Conducts" includes initiating, concluding, or participating in initi-
ating or concluding a transaction. 
(3) (a) "Currency" means the coin and paper money of the United 
States or of any other country that is designated as legal tender, that 
circulates, and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of 
exchange in the country of issuance. 
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(b) "Currency" includes United States silver certificates, United 
States notes, Federal Reserve notes, and foreign bank notes custom-
arily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in a foreign country. 
(4) "Financial institution" means any agent, agency, branch, or office 
within this state of any person doing business, whether or not on a regular 
basis or as an organized business concern, in one or more of the following 
capacities: 
(a) a bank, except bank credit card systems; 
(b) a broker or dealer in securities; 
(c) a currency dealer or exchanger, including a person engaged in 
the business of check cashing; 
(d) an issuer, seller, or redeemer of travelers checks or money 
orders, except as a selling agent exclusively who does not sell more 
than $150,000 of the instruments within any 30-day period; 
(e) a licensed transmitter of funds or other person engaged in the 
business of transmitting funds; 
(f) a telegraph company; 
(g) a person subject to supervision by any state or federal supervi-
sory authority; or 
(h) the United States Postal Service regarding the sale of money 
orders. 
(5) "Financial transaction" means a transaction: 
(a) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or 
involving one or more monetary instruments, which in any way or 
degree affects commerce; or 
(b) involving the use of a financial institution that is engaged in, or 
its activities affect commerce in any way or degree. 
(6) The phrase "knowing that the property involved in a financial 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity" 
means that the person knows the property involved in the transaction 
represents proceeds from a form, though he does not necessarily know 
which form, of activity that constitutes a felony under state or federal law, 
regardless of whether or not the activity is specified in Subsection (9). 
(7) "Monetary instruments" means coins or currency of the United 
States or of any other country, travelers checks, personal checks, bank 
checks, money orders, and investment securities or negotiable instru-
ments in bearer form or in other form so that title passes upon delivery. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, trust or 
estate, joint stock company, association, syndicate, joint venture, or other 
unincorporated organization or group, and all other entities cognizable as 
legal personalities. 
(9) "Prosecuting agency" means the office of the attorney general or the 
office of the county attorney, including any attorney on the staff whether 
acting in a civil or criminal capacity. 
(10) "Specified unlawful activity" means any unlawful activity defined 
as an unlawful activity in Section 76-10-1602, except Subsection (4Xaaaa), 
and includes activity committed outside this 6tate which, if committed 
within this state, would be unlawful activity. 
(11) "Transaction" means a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, 
delivery, or other disposition. With respect to a financial institution, 
"transaction" includes a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between accounts, 
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exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any 
stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, or any 
other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institu-
tion, by whatever means effected. 
(12) "Transaction in currency means a transaction involving the physi-
cal transfer of currency from one person to another. A transaction that is 
a transfer of funds by means of bank check, bank draft, wire transfer, or 
other written order that does not include the physical transfer of currency 
is not a transaction in currency under this chapter 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1902, enacted by Federal Law. — Section 401 of the National 
L. 1989, ch. 241, § 2; 1993, ch. 80, S 1. Housing Act, cited in Subsection dXd), was 12 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- U.S.C. $ 1724. It was repealed in 1989, along 
xnent, effective May 3,1993, added Subsections with the rest of Subchapter IV of the Act, 
(1), (4), and (9), deleted former Subsections (7) Insurance of Savings and Loan Accounts, 
and (8), which defined "reporting institution" Compiler's Notes. — The reference in Sub-
and "reporting person," and redesignated the g ^ o n
 (6 ) to Subsection (9) should now cite 
remaining subsections accordingly and, in Sub- Subsection (10), which specifies unlawful activ-
section (10) substituted "defined as an unlaw-
 i t y Bnd w h i c h w a s ^designated from (9) to (10) 
ful activity* for "as defined" near the beginning
 b y ihe 1 9 9 3 amendment, 
and added all of the language beginning with 
•except" at the end. 
76-10-1903. Money laundering by financial transaction — 
Elements — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by financial transac-
tion if, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction repre-
sents proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, he conducts or attempts to 
conduct a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity: 
(a) with intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; 
or 
(b) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to: 
(i) conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the 
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; 
or 
(ii) avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter. 
(2) Money laundering by financial transaction is a second degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1903, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 241, ft 3. 
76-10-1904. Money laundering by transportation — Ele-
ments — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits the offense of money laundering by transportation if 
he transports or attempts to transport a monetary instrument or funds: 
(a) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity; or 
(b) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in the 
transportation represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity 
and knowing that the transportation is designed in whole or in part to: 
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